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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRED DEMMAN, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

STAR BROADCASTING CO. and
LARRY WILCOX,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12729

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff sought damages from the owner of a radio
station and from an announcer for defamation in a raido
broadcast.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Star Broadcasting Company operates
radio station KSXX in Salt Lake City. The station's
programming centers around "two-way radio," in which
listeners telephone "communicasters" and discuss on the
air various topics of public interest. Defendant Larry
Wilcox was a KSXX communicaster.
In the fall of 1970, plaintiff wa!-etVPdidate for a
four-year term on the Salt Lake · Commission
(Demman 8) . On the afternoon of November 3, 1970,
election day, an unidentified man telephoned defendant
Wilcox and initiated a discussion concerning plaintiff's
qualifications for the office he was seeking. During the
conversation, the following exchange was broadcast:

Caller:*** now, you cannot name me, you cannot tell me, nor any of these Democratic callers,
where that man is qualified to handle 29 million
dollars of the taxpayers' money, that's comin up
in here. He has not had any qualifications, his
schooling is not for that, uh uh, he's in debt with
his brother in here, through the state, because
they don't pay their bills. Now, now let's look a
little bit further. What kind of an outfit does that
man run down there?

Wilcox: I don't know. Is he a business man?

Cmler: Business man.*** Demman, right across
the street from the Utah Power & Light Company.

Wucox: Oh.
Caller: If, if you want to go to the Go-Go Girls,
that's it. If you want to go buy liquor by the
drink, that's it. If you want to, ha, I won't say it.

Wilcox: Ha, ha.
Caller: If you want to get to other places on here,
it's, it's available for ya, uuh

Wilcox: Well, then, he's qualified as a, well, I
won't say.
Cmler: He's qualified.

Wilcox: Ha, ha, ha.
Caller: He's qualified for the, uh right in with the
underworld, 'n I think uh if he can get in in here,
he wants to make these laws prosperous for his
business out here.

(R. 22) 1
About ten or fifteen minutes later, an unidentified
woman telephoned defendant Wilcox and chastised him
for the conversation concerning plaintiff. The conversation was interrupted by Paul Droubay, one of the officers of Star Broadcasting Co., and Mr. Droubay made a
IR-22 refers to page 22 of the court record. References to
deposition testimony are preceded by the deponent's name.
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public apology for statements made during the first
broadcast (Demman 12, R. 24) . The two conversations
and the retraction were taped by Star Broadcasting Co.
and a transcription was made of them. The transcript is
set out in full at R. 21-24.
In order to keep some control over what callers may
say during the two-way radio conversation, the defendant Star Broadcasting Co. utilizes a system under which
the broadcast runs seven seconds behind the two-way
conversation. If something occurs during a conversation
that a communicaster believes should not go on the air,
he may push a button which cuts off the delayed broadcast and puts the parties on a direct live broadcast, thereby excising seven seconds of talk. If a caller continues to
make proscribed comments, the communicaster can cut
off the conversation altogether. Defendant Wilcox did
not cut off any of the conversation concerning plaintiff.
Defendant Wilcox did not know plaintiff personally. He knew his name and that he was running for
office but nothing more about him ('Vilcox 9) · At the
time of the broadcast, he didn't know whether the statements were true (Wilcox 9, 11) . There is no evidence
that any other officer or employee of Star Broadcasting
Co. was aware of the contents of the broadcast at the
time it was made. Defendant Wilcox, during his employment at radio station KSXX, had used the delay button
only three or four times and sometimes had been confused as to whether or not he should use it (Wilcox 16).
In addition to being a candidate for public office,
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the plaintiff was one of the principals in a company
known as Demman Enterprises, Inc. (Demman 4) . The
company owned property across the street from the Utah
Power and Light Company on North Temple Street il1
Salt Lake City, part of which was leased to a private club
known as the Putter Club (Demman 6, 7). This club is
licensed to sell liquor and does in fact employ go-go girls
(Demman 7, 18).
Respondents agree with appellant's statement of
facts except as follows: the paraphrase of the conversation in Paragraph 5 is not accurate; and for the purposes
of the summary judgment motion no admissions were
made, though respondents did and do contend that the
truth or falsity of the information, in light of the
"malice" tests hereinafter discussed, is not a material
fact.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN ORDER TO RECOVER IN THIS ACTION
THE PLAINTIFF, BEING A PUBLIC FIGURE, MUST SHOW "ACTUAL MALICE" ON
THE PART OF DEFENDANTS.
In the past eight years, the law of defamation, particularly as it relates to public officials, public figures,
and public issues, has been rewritten. The United States
Supreme Court in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964),
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held that in certain instances common law tort rules relating to libel and slander had to give way to requirements of Amendments I and XIV, United States Constitution. In that case, the trial court had entered a judgment in the amount of $500,000 against the New York
Times based on an advertisement which in effect accused
the plaintiff, a Montgomery (Ala.) City Commissioner,
of intentional interference with civil rights. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the judgment saying:
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct
to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions
-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a comparablf'
"self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of
truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will
be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as
an adequate safeguard have recognized the diffi.
culties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged
libel was true in all its factual particulars. * * *
Under such a rule, would-be critics of official
conduct would be deterred from voicing their
criticism, even though it is believed to be true and
even though it is in fact true, because of doubt
whether it can be proved in court or fear of the
expense of having to
s?· * * *
rule
dampens the vigor and lumts the variety of public
debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The constitutional guarantees require, we think,
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with "actual malice"
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-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The court noted that a like rule already had been
adopted by a number of state courts including those in
North Carolina, Michigan, Kansas, West Virginia,
Iowa, California, South Dakota, Arizona, and Minnesota.
Decisions since New York Times have applied the
rule to public figures as well as public officials, and to
public issues in which private figures are involved, and
have refined the definition of "actual malice."
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 28
L.Ed.2d 35, 91 S.Ct. 621, 642 (1970), the plaintiff, a
candidate for United States Senator in a Democratic
primary in New Hampshire, brought a libel action
against a daily newspaper for carrying a Washington
Merry-Go-Round column referring to him as a "former
small-time bootlegger." The court noted that the need
for the New York Times rule is a least as acute in the
case of a candidate for public office as in the case of a
public official. The court said:
The trial judge instructed the jury that Roy,
as a candidate for elective public office, was a
"public official," and that characterization has
not been challenged here. Given the later cases,
it might be preferable to categorize a candidate
as a "public figure," if for no other
than to
avoid straining the common meanmg of words.
But the question is of no importance so far as a
standard of liability in this case is concerned, for
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it
clear that,. whichever term is ap.
phed, publications concernmg candidates must be
accorded at least as much protection under the
First and Fourteenth Amendment as those concerning occupants of public office.
The court also disapproved the practice of letting a
jury determine whether particular conduct is "official
conduct," or whether it is relevant to the qualifications of
a candidate for public office. The court pointed out that:
The principal activity of a candidate in our
political system, his "office," so to speak, consists
in putting before the voters every conceivable
aspect of his public and private life which he
thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good im·
pression of him. A candidate who, for example,
seeks to further his cause through the prominent
display of his wife and children can hardly argue
that his qualities as a husband or father remain of
"purely private" concern. And the candidate who
vaunts his spotless record and sterling integrity
cannot convincingly cry "Foul!" when an opponent or industrious reporter attempts to demon·
strate the contrary. Any test adequate to safeguard First Amendment guarantees in this area
must go far beyond the customary meaning of the
phrase "official conduct·"
The cases now also make it clear that "actual
malice" cannot be proved by the contents of the publication itself; that it is not equivalent to ill will; and that
it must be proved by establishing that the person publishing the defamatory statement knew it was false or
acted with "reckless disregard" of whether it was true
or false. Moreover,, "reckless disregard" has now been
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defined to the point where it is possible to determine
many cases by summary judgment or directed verdict.
In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 26 L.Ed.2d 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537 (1970),
the court said :
In his charge to the members of the jury, the
trial judge repeatedly instructed them that Bresler could recover if the petitioners' publications
had been made with malice or with a reckless disregard of whether they were true or false. This
instruction was given in one form or another half
a dozen times during the course of the judge's
charge. The judge then defined "malice" to include "spite, hositility or deliberate intention to
harm." Moreover, he instructed the jury that
"malice" could be found from the "language" of
the publication itself. Thus the jury was permitted to find liability merely on the basis of a
combination of falsehood and general hostility.
This was error of constitutional magnitude, as
our decisions have made clear. "This definition of
malice is constitutionally insufficient where discussion of public affairs is concerned; '[w)e held
in New Times that a public official might be
allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes
that the utterance was false and that it was made
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true.' "

POINT II
THE DEPOSITIONS ON FILE ESTABLISH
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHICH
\VOULD JUSTIFY A FINDING OF ACTUAL
MALICE.
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The pleadings and depositions establish that except
for an unknown caller, only defendant Wilcox was involved in the broadcast concerning the plaintiff. The
question thus becomes one of whether he could be said to
have acted with actual malice in permitting the telephone conversation to be broadcast. In order toe.stablish
this actual malice, plaintiff must prove that when the
broadcast was made defendant Wilcox knew that the
statements were false or acted in reckless disregard of
whether they were false or true, and "reckless disregard''
is itself a term of art.
In Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 13
L.Ed.2d 125, 85 S.Ct. 209 ( 1964), the Supreme Court
pointed out what is meant by reckless disregard:

* * * Only those false statements made with
the high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity demanded by New York Times may be
subject to either civil or criminal sanctions.
In St. Am.ant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 20 L.
ED.2d 262, 88 S.Ct. 1323 ( 1968), the Supreme Court
went into more detail in explaining the term, saying:
Purporting to apply the New York Times
malice standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court
ruled that St. Amant had broadcast false information about Thompson recklessly, though
knowingly. Several reasons were given for this
conclusion. St. Amant had no personal
of Thompson's activity; relied
on Albm s
as to
affidavit although the rec?rd was
bin's reputation for veracity;. he failed. to
the information with those m the umon office
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who might have known the facts; he gave no consideration as to whether or not the statements defamed Thompson and went ahead heed.less of the
consequences; and he mistakenly believed he had
no responsibility for the broadcast because he was
merely quoting Albin's words.
These considerations fall short of proving St.
Amant's reckless disregard for the accuracy of
the statements about Thompson. "Reckless disregard," it is true, cannot be fully encompassed
in one infallible definition. Inevitably its outer
limits will be marked out through case-by-case
adjudication as is true with so many legal standards for judging concrete cases, whether the
standard is provided by the Constitution, statutes,
or case law. Our cases, however, have furnished
meaningful guidance for the further definition of
a reckless publication. In New York Times,
supra, the plaintiff did not satisfy his burden because the record failed to show that the publisher
was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false information. In Garrison V· Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 85 S.Ct. 209
( 1964), also decided before the decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in this case, the opinion
emphasized the necessity for a showing that a
false publication was made with a "high degree of
awareness of*** probable falsity." 379 U.S. 74,
13 L.Ed.2d 133. Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in
Curtis Publishing Company v. Bulls, 388 U.S.
130 153 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 1110, 87 s.ct. 1975
( 1967) , 'stated that evidence. of
falsification or reckless rubhcat10n
the
publisher's awareness o
was
essential to recovery by pubhc off1c1als m defamation actions. These cases are clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a rea-
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sonably pru?ent man would have published, or
would have
before publishing. There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant infact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for
truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
(Emphasis added.)
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29
L.Ed.2d 296, 91 S.Ct. 1811 (1970), plaintiff had been
described in radio broadcasts as a "smut peddler," but in
another proceeding a court had found that the material ,
being sold by plaintiff was not obscene. A jury returned
a verdict and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for
general and punitive damages. The court of appeals
held, as a matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment under the standards of New
York Times. Directing itself to the question of actual
malice, the court said:

Following petitioner's complaint about the accuracy of the broadcast, WIP checked its last report with the judge who presided in the case. ,
While we may assume that the district court cor·
rectly held to be defamatory respondent's characterizations of petitioner's business as "the smut
literature racket," and of those engaged in it as
"girlie-book peddlers," there is no evidence in the
record to support a
that
"in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of its reports.

In Beckley Newspapers Corporation V· Hanks, 38!>
U.S. 81, 19 L.Ed.2d 248, 88 S.Ct. 197 (1967), the plain-
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tiff had relied largely upon the fact that defendants had
not made a pre-publication investigation of material that
turned out to be defamatory and that for this reason
there was a "reckless disregard" of whether the statements were false or true. Although the record disclosed
that no pre-publication investigation had been made, the
jury verdict for the plaintiff was not permitted to stand.
The Supreme Court said:
Neither this passage nor anything else in the
record reveals "the high degree of awareness of
* * * probable falsity demanded by New York
Times***" Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,
74, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 133, 85 S.Ct. 209; it cannot
be said on this record that any failure of petitioner
to make a prior investigation constituted proof
sufficient to present a jury question whether the
statements were published with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
See also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 28 L.
Ed.2d 45, 91 S. Ct. 633 ( 1971), and Tilton v. Cowle.s
Publishing Company, 76 Wash.2d 784, 459 P.2d 8
(1969).
In the present case, a summary judgment was taken
after the court had before it depositions of all of the persons involved in the publication including the plaintiff,
the communicaster, an officer of, and the program director of Star Broadcasting Co. Considering all available evidence, a jury would have to base a finding of
actual malice solely on the fact that defendant Wilcox
had failed, during the seven second delay, to use the cut
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off button. Wilcox testified that he didn't know whether
the statements were true and that he had no knowledge
about Fred Demman (Wilcox 9, II, 13). Paul Droubay,
one of the officers and stockholders of Star Broadcast·
ing Co., pointed out that because of the nature of "talk"
programs, broadcasters sometimes forget that they are
on the radio and some confusion exists with respect to
hitting the cut off button (Droubay 14, 15).
There is nothing in the record suggesting that defendants had any awareness, let alone the required "high
degree of awareness" that the statements were probably
false. During plaintiff's deposition, he and his counsel
took the position that actual malice would be shown by
the following facts: that the telephone conversation occurred at 2 :30 p.m. on election day when nobody had a
chance to say anything in defense; that plaintiff had
been ahead in the polls; that Wilcox was not apologetic;
that no investigation had been made to determine the
truth; that Mr. Wilcox didn't use the seven second delay button; and that Mr. Wilcox must have know they
were damaging (Demman 9-ll, 27-28). Otherwise stated, the malice was based upon ( l) what the man said,
( 2) the way Mr. Wilcox laughed and carried on, and .
( 3) that defendant Wilcox encouraged the caller and
didn't cut him off.
But actual malice, as pointed out above, cannot be
established by the content of the communication itself;
neither may it be based upon a concept of hate, spite, or
ill feeling. It requires a finding that the communication

14

was known to be false, or that the publisher had a high
degree of awareness of its probable falsity.
In St. Am.ant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 20 L.Ed.
2d 262, 88 S.Ct. 1323 ( 1968), the court noted that the
defense of good faith would not be likely to prevail
"when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them
in circulation." Even this statement does not help plaintiff because the statements made by the anonymous caller were not inherently improbable. In fact, the plaintiff's
own testimony shows some cause to believe that the statements were substantially if not technically true. A private locker club known as the Putter Club was located
on property owned by Demman Enterprises, Inc., of
which plaintiff was one-third owner; liquor was dispensed by way of mini-bottles at the Putter Club; and
go-go dancers were employed at the Putter Club. The
other statements made by the caller, about getting other
things, and about plaintiff being qualified like a member
of the underworld, were vague expressions of opinion
based upon the facts and did not impute crime or immorality to the plaintiff.
Under the circumstances, there is not sufficient evidence of actual malice to present the case to a jury.
Therefore, the court should have granted summary
judgment. In W a.Yhington Post v. Keogh, 355 F.2d
965, (D.C.Cir. 1966), the plaintiff had sued a newspaper
because of statements in a column by Drew Pearson. The
newspaper moved for summary judgment on the ground
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that the record raised no genuine issue as to actual malice
on its part. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment but was reversed by the court of appeals
on interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals said:
. That state of mind should generally be a jury
issue does not mean it should always be so in all
contexts, especially where the issue is recklessness
which is ordinarily inferred from objective facts.
Summary judgment serves important functions
which would be left undone if the courts too re·
strictively viewed their power. * * *
In the First Amendment area, summary procedures are even more essential. For the stake
here, if harrassment succeeds, is free debate. One
of the purposes of the Times principle, in addition
to protecting persons from being cast in damages
in libel suits filed by public officials, is to prevent
persons from being discouraged in the full and
free exercise of their First Amendment rights
with respect to the conduct of their government.
The threat of being put to the defense of a lawsuit
brought by a popular public official may be as
chilling to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms as fear of the outcome of the lawsuit itself.

***

It is undisputed that no issue of fact exists here
as to publication with actual
falsity.
The unimpeached Post personnel depos1t10ns are
dis positive of this issue. * * * Rather, Keogh asserts the columns were published with reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity. His
argument on appeal, accepted by the D1stnct
Court, is that the "character and content of the
publication itself" is
take the case
the jury on actual malice m light of the Posh
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failure to check the accuracy of Pearson's columns before publication. The Supreme Court
held in Times, of course, that the character and
content of the publication there involved was a
impermissible evidentiary basis
f a fmdmg. of actual. malice, even though the
Times had failed to venfy its contents. * * *

o:

But even if it were tenable to argue that the
charges here are "more serious" than those in
Times, the seriousness of the charge, in itself, is
not probative of recklessness with respect to the
truth. T,he most serious charges, which if anything we have the most reason to avoid deterring,
may be made responsibly with no hint of anything
contrary to common knowledge, while less serious
charges may be made rashly, with internal inconsistencies, citing facts contrary to common
knowledge.***
As the court indicated in Times, evidence offered in a libel case might be sufficient to raise a
jury question as to a publisher's negligence but
insufficient to raise one as to his actual malice.
***
We would be hesitant to impose responsibilities
upon newspapers which can be met only through
costly procedures or through self-censorship designed to avoid the risks of publishing controversial material. The costliness of this process would
especially deter less established publishers from
taking chances and, since colum!1s such as
son' s are highly popular attractions, co1!1petition
with publishers who can afford to verify or to
litigate would become even
.di'ff'icu1.t.. * *.
.
What matters is that a rule reqwmng verification
in the absence of evidence that the publisher had
good reason to suspect falsity would curtail sub-
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stanti<illy a protected form of speech. ( Emphasi1
added.)
·
The foregoing and other cases have established a
federal libel law that governs state action insofar as po·
litical candidates are concerned. But there is no conflict
with Utah law in this regard, for Utah Legislature ha1
adopted the "actual malice" test. It is provided in 45-2.j
Utah Code Annotated 1953:
No person, firm or corporation owning or op·
erating a radio or television broadcasting station
or network of stations shall be Hable under the
laws of libel, slander, or defamation on account of
having made its broadcasting facilities or network
available to any person, whether a candidate for
public office or any other person, or on account
of having originated or broadcast a program for
discussion of controversial or any other subjects,
in the absence of proof of actual malice on the
part of such owner or operator. In no event, however, shall any such owner or operator be held
liable for any damages for any defamatory state·
ment uttered over the facilities of such station or
network by or on behalf of any candidate for pub·
lie office.
It is apparent from the depositions on file in this
case that the plaintiff has no evidence of actual malice
and has no prospects of obtaining any. It would thus be
futile to return the case for trial.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S ACTION IS BARRED BY THE
PROVISIONS OF 45-2-5 UTAH CODE ANNO·
TATED 1953.
18

The final sentence of 45-2-5 Utah Code Annotated
1953, quoted above, provides that the owner or operator

of a radio station may not be held liable for any damages
for defamatory statements made by or on behalf of any
candidate for public office.
The statements made by the unidentified caller
were made during a political campaign, on the day of the
election, when numerous persons were calling the station
to talk about various candidates. A reading of the broadcast transcript shows that the statements made by the
unidentified caller were made in behalf of plaintiff's
opponent in the election. As admitted by plaintiff (Wilcox 34), candidates frequently have people call KSXX
in their behalf.
Although the phrase "on behalf of" has not been
defined by the statute or by any decision of this court,
the statute indicates a legislative intent to encourage the
freest possible discussion of election issues, candidates
for public office, and the qualifications of such candidates. The statutory provision, therefore, should be interpreted to include statements by persons in support of
a particular candidate over another, whether or not any
technical relationship can be shown between the candidate and the person who speaks.
CONCLUSION
Before defendants moved for summary judgment,
the parties had had an opportunity for discovery and
had taken it. All persons who had anything to do with
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the case, except the unidentified caller (who will pro0.
ably remain unidentified) were deposed and the cour1
had before it all of the testimony that could reasonabli
be produced at a trial. If all of the evidence available tc
the plaintiff had been presented at a trial of the case
there would have been insufficient evidence to let the
case go to the jury on the question of "actual malice.'
Moreover, considering the context in which statement
were made, it is clear that they were made "on behalf of
a political candidate during a political campaign ana
hence an action will not lie against the broadcaster or the
owner of the radio station. This being the case, summary
judgment was properly granted and the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Bryce E. Roe
Roe, Fowler, Jerman & Dart
340 East Fourth South Sreet

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Respondents
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